Evolutionary Function Of Resentment

A semantic layer navigation exercise. Since vertically downward exploration was the default mode for this particular exercise, semantic layers downwards will be increasing numbers, while upward layers will be -ve integers.

0. What function does G-resentment have?

1. What function does resentment in general serve?

Don’t get mad, get even — why are those two different things as allowed by evolution? Shouldn’t the only purpose of mad be get even if possible Sometimes action isn’t possible, will result in failure. Shouldn’t the mad go away then after failure? Assuming it does go away: Maybe purpose of the saying is because evolutionarily our mad will go away after we give up, so we should be pumped to get even, even when we (sans pumping) can’t. But then, you don’t need to say ‘don’t get mad’, the mad has gone away by the time your need for motivation hits. Motivation isn’t delivered at time for need for motivation — it is given to all, as precursor, and the remaining mad-quota will be siphoned off into pumped-for-even quota even before it is experientially clear that sans-pump self would not have been able to achieve the even-getting. This is of course disqualifying a world where it is ‘get mad and also get even’, which is not very obviously an inferior strategy. But it is less interesting, so we stick to a world where it is either/or mad/even.

2. If that’s accepted logic, then any act that causes me harm I will ask two questions; A. Do I prefer a world where no one is allowed to cause that harm? Then I need to get mad; B. Do I prefer a world where everyone is allowed to cause that harm? Let’s say a world where insensitive jokes are allowed in a romantic moment, obviously I do, Then I need to accept this current instance of harm-act gleefully. This assumes that when I accept current instance gleefully, filing away instance as ‘break in case of fire’ when I cause same harm-act next, it will be respected.

3. How does one evaluate option B? I make an insensitive joke when I judge it right. Then she does. Then I do. Does this have any erosive property? Is erosive probability higher than the safe/secure comfort of not needing to hold back when judged correctly and not feeling guilty because it’s something we each accept? It can’t be a blanket rule, I have different utility curves, so in this instance of insensitive joke, I’m on the side of libertarian acceptism.

<End tree>

2. Does resentment serve any function? Can things that don’t serve a function, exist? Things that don’t serve any function but do not harm, still would have served a function in the past. So do I believe a thing without any past-function? Yes, male nipples exist on the strength of their function in too-genetically similar species, the female. So, it is interesting to analyze previous layer of resentment through lens of its possible past/related functions before writing off. What about things that have no related function either, but net neutral? Freak accident? Yes maybe. What about things that are net-negative? They can be tolerated if a non-survival threatening negative.

3. Does this mean this level of tolerance will increase when survival conditions are better, and decrease when worse? That doesn’t seem intuitive, given when conditions are worse we should be better habituated? Porque no los dos? Conditions drop below the survival threshold for the phenotype, so those without net-negative will survive, and this case collapses. But when conditions are above threshold, it will allow a greater range of pain available in population, so does average well-being go down when conditions are good?

4. What are necessary proofs before we can conclude that reducing survival conditions will increase average well-being after few populations, even if reduced conditions are maintained. Let’s say pain in teeth goes down when survival conditions worsen. This isn’t enough to decide, what are new pains caused by reduced survival conditions and do they compensate for the reduction in teeth pain?

5. Proof for possibility of survival conditions that compensate with reduction in teeth pain: Survival condition isn’t changing from next generation, so if pain caused by survival condition is higher than the threshold it will get selected out. So this pain is gone, tooth pain is gone, we are net one pain less. On the other hand, if the pain is less than the threshold, it will continue to exist after tooth pain has been selected out, so we aren’t one pain less. But maybe it is a lesser pain we switched out for tooth pain? Not necessary, it is only a pain that is better suited to this reduced survival condition.

6. Can we assume that ‘survival condition’ can be so broad that it will treat all pains the same and not be specially harsh or lenient on any. Or put more simply, can we assume that all different expressions of pain can be translated into a common format like binary or something, so all are apples to apples. Yes

5. Can pain go from above-threshold to zero, or will it gradually follow and then stabilize just below the threshold? Case definitely does not work if it gradually dips and stabilizes below threshold, since now we have objective one extra pain which cannot compensate for reduction in tooth pain. Case works if tooth pain disappears, that means it is a single gene, in the on-on position of genotypes. Which will be a 1/4th probability in the starting population. So in cases where it is a single gene, total wellbeing has gone up by 25X in population of 100, where X is per person value of pain. This assumes certain boundary conditions for measuring average wellbeing. Let’s start with 100 people, population remains constant after all the generations it took for the selection, so simple division.

6. Is this a ridiculously elaborate way of arriving at the very novel idea that if survival of the fittest, then harder conditions mean fitter specimens? No it’s not, we don’t care about the nature of their fitness or qualities, only in their subjective experience and whether the average subjective experience is better. So the item to prove is that fitter organisms in harsher climes have better subjective experience than less fit organisms in easier climes?What if we did this in a single generation, threshold lowered, all populations below this are gone, nothing else is affected at all, this is the most sanitized example, and clearly it works in this example. Can it work across generations using regular natural selection.

This collapses the semantic layers 2–6 and leaves us with two possibilities. Either survival conditions have been good enough that they allowed for net-negative evolutionary misfits like resentment. Or survival conditions were harsh enough that all extant qualities, like resentment, must serve an evolutionary purpose. In both cases, the best way to proceed is to assume it serves a purpose, uncover the potential purpose, and act on it to see if the resulting new equilibrium has decreased resentment that increases Bayesian probability of it being purposeful.

This concludes the semantic order navigation. The ease with which I am bailing out of this post now, without having even touched on the +ve semantic layers, and relegating the answer to the original question to a succeeding blog post for another day, is evidence in favor of the theory that a vertical Jeopardy strategy decreases overall payoff by encouraging exit when the payoff drops during switching of categories. This will not be confirmed until I rule out the possibility that all mental exercises are finite in time and effort, and given limited sample space, it is better to maximize payoff in the most linear trajectory possible.